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Abstract 
 
This study provides an empirical analysis of the 2008 short sale ban.  The evidence 
suggests that the presence of tradable options plays a crucial role in determining the 
effect of a short sale ban.  Results show that if there are no traded options on a stock, the 
short sale ban brought abnormal returns of roughly +8%.  However if there are traded 
options on a stock, the market maker exemptions nullify the positive effects of the ban.  
Furthermore, for the banned stocks that do experience positive abnormal returns during 
the ban, the lifting of the ban causes a prompt reversal of these returns.  Findings suggest 
short sale bans cause an underrepresentation of negative opinions for as long as the ban 
lasts and that the presence of tradable options eliminates that underrepresentation by 
providing an alternative for pessimistic investors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
“The emergency order temporarily banning short selling of financial stocks will 
restore equilibrium to markets” (Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman, 19 September 
2008, SEC News Release 2008-211). 
 
 
 
“Knowing what we know now, I believe on balance the commission would not do 
it again. The costs (of the short-selling ban on financials) appear to outweigh the 
benefits.” (Christopher Cox, telephone interview to Reuters, 31 December 2008). 
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I. Motivation 
 
 There is a great deal of academic research around the 2008 short sale ban.  
Research generally focuses on the ban’s effect on market quality, as measured by a 
number of metrics, primarily stock price volatility, and liquidity (determined by bid-ask 
spreads).  There is also a great deal of research on the options market during the short 
sale ban, again focusing on option price volatility and bid-ask spreads.  There is a 
seemingly obvious dividing line within the banned stocks that has garnered very little 
academic attention.  I intend to make this distinction.  This paper will divide the 797 
banned stocks into two groups: stocks with traded options, and stocks without traded 
options.  Despite its lack of attention, this distinction proves to have dramatic 
implications in the context of a short sale ban. 
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II. Introduction 
 
 The fundamental root of pricing, in any context, is a balance of supply and 
demand; a balance of those who wish to sell and those who wish to buy.  There is almost 
nothing priced more exactly than stocks.  One of the critical reasons for this precision is 
the existence of short selling.  Unlike most marketplaces, in the stock market one does 
not need to own something in order to sell it.  This fundamental feature means that supply 
is not limited to those that already own the asset.  If anyone can sell the asset, the market 
aggregates all of the opinions present, those that would choose to sell at this price and 
those that would choose to buy at this price, regardless of current ownership.  All those 
that would choose to sell form the supply, and all those that would choose to buy form 
the demand.  The aggregate supply and demand curves intersect to determine the true 
equilibrium price. 
 Without short sales, the stock market would look like the market for any other 
good in which delivery is required immediately upon purchase.  Take the market for 
hotdogs as an example.   Only those who already have hotdogs can determine if the 
current price is a good price at which to sell hotdogs.  If an outside observer sees the 
market for hotdogs and determines that they would like to sell hotdogs for that price then 
they must buy the already overpriced hotdogs first before they can sell them, hoping that 
the price continues to rise, or alternatively they can choose to sit out of the market.  The 
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simple equities stock market would behave the same way as our theoretical hotdogs 
market if not for the existence of short sales. 
 If only current owners of an asset can sell, but anyone can buy, then there is a 
mismatch of opinions allowed in the marketplace.  Restrictions on short sales only affect 
those with negative opinions about a stock.   All positive opinions are present in the 
marketplace while only the portion of negative opinions associated with current stock 
ownership is present.  This mismatch creates upward pressure on the stock price that 
would not be present if the negative investors who do not own the stock were still 
allowed to sell it, contributing to supply. 
 On September 18
th
, 2008, the SEC banned short sales of 797 financial stocks.  If 
not for two key elements, this ban would have made the equities markets for these banned 
stocks behave just like our theoretical hotdog market.  These key elements are the options 
market, and the market maker exemption. 
 There are a number of alternative investment strategies that an investor can 
employ to benefit from a decrease in stock price.  For the most part these alternatives 
revolve around the options market, specifically puts and calls.  A put is a contract that 
gives the purchaser the right to sell an asset at a predetermined price.  A call contract 
gives the purchaser the right to buy an asset at a predetermined price.  There are an 
extraordinary number of investment possibilities available through the buying and selling 
of puts and calls.  The most relevant of these strategies is the synthetic short sale.  To 
execute a synthetic short sale an investor buys at the money puts and sells at the money 
calls.  Through this strategy an investor will receive a nearly identical payoff to a real 
9 
 
 
 
short sale.  An investor would employ this strategy if he or she has negative opinions, 
meaning that he or she believes a stock price will decrease. 
 The second key element is the market maker exemption. Market makers are 
critical in a modern marketplace to preserve liquidity. Market makers must provide a 
customer with a price for a given security or derivative, even if the price is hard to 
determine at the time.  In order to execute these trades, market makers must be able to 
simultaneously hedge the exposure created by the customer’s trade.  Short sales are often 
required for this hedge.  If a negative investor creates the synthetic short sale mentioned 
in the previous paragraph with an options market maker, the market maker is left with the 
reverse of the negative investor’s trade.  The counterparty to a short sale, the buyer, is left 
with a long position in the stock; similarly, the counterparty to a synthetic short, the 
market maker, is left with a synthetic long position.  The market maker cannot afford to 
simply take the other side of every trade.  If he or she cannot pair two investors that wish 
to take opposite positions, then the market maker must hedge away all of the exposure 
created by the investor’s position.  Market makers make their money from the bid-ask 
spread, not from speculative bets that come from taking the other side of investor trades.  
This conservatism is the reason that the SEC could allow market makers to remain 
exempt from the short sale ban. 
 This study will examine the extent to which negative investors transferred their 
investments into the options market when short sales were no longer a possibility during 
the short sale ban.  Abnormal options volume will be studied for this period along with 
the pre and post ban periods.  The study will then test the effects of the removal of 
10 
 
 
 
pessimistic opinions on the share prices of banned stocks.  This test will be done by 
separating the stocks with and without traded options, thereby separating the stocks still 
subject to market maker hedging.  In theory the stocks with traded options will maintain 
the true price because the pessimistic opinions are brought to the marketplace in the form 
of hedging through the market maker.  The market maker will have no reason to hedge in 
the stocks without traded options and thus their share prices will be allowed to inflate 
because of the removal of pessimistic investors. 
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III. Historical Context 
 
In 2007 and 2008 the world went through what came to be known as the global 
financial crisis, widely believed to be the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression.  The crisis resulted in the total collapse of two of the largest banks in the 
world, government bailout of the banking industry, and downturns in stock markets 
around the globe. 
This worldwide financial crisis resulted in significant erosion of confidence in the 
banking system.  In the summer of 2008 the Securities and Exchange Commission began 
a series of market restrictions intended to protect the banking industry from excessive 
downward pressure on share prices.  To that end, the SEC first took aim at the use of the 
naked short sale. Unlike a regular short sale, a naked short sale does not require the 
parties involved to go through the usual borrowing procedures prior to the sale and so can 
produce significantly more risk.  One of the resulting restrictions was the July 15
th
 ban on 
naked short selling that the SEC imposed on 19 of the largest at-risk financial stocks, 
including the likes of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the largest of the commercial and 
investment banks.  The ban was extended once and then allowed to expire on August 
12
th
.  On September 17
th
 the SEC placed new restrictions, banning naked short selling in 
all U.S. stocks.  The following day the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority temporarily 
banned all short sales in 32 financial stocks.   
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That same day, September 18
th
, 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
announced that it would widen the restrictions and temporarily ban all types of short 
selling in 799 financial stocks (the actual list released contained only 797).  This more 
significant ban took effect the following morning, September 19
th
.  Initially the ban was 
to cover 10 trading days, but was later extended to 14.  September 19
th
 saw bans on short 
selling of financial stocks not only in the U.S. but in the U.K., Canada, Ireland, and 
Luxembourg as well.  Within the next few days all of the largest European countries 
banned short selling of financial stocks.  Australia and Spain banned short selling of all 
stocks. 
The SEC cited the crisis of confidence as the main reason for the ban and 
restoring price stability as the primary goal. The SEC press release stated; 
Given the importance of confidence in our financial markets as a whole, 
we have become concerned about recent sudden declines in the prices of a 
wide range of securities. Such price declines can give rise to questions 
about the underlying financial condition of an issuer, which in turn can 
create a crisis of confidence, without a fundamental underlying basis. This 
crisis of confidence can impair the liquidity and ultimate viability of an 
issuer, with potentially broad market consequences. Our concerns are no 
longer limited to the financial institutions that were the subject of the July 
Emergency Order.
1
 
The SEC hoped to stop the rapid drops in financial stock prices until the condition of the 
overall market improved.  They believed short sales to be one of the primary causes of 
                                                     
1
 Harmon, Florence E. "SEC Halts Short Selling of Financial Stocks to Protect Investors and Markets." 
(Press Release No. 2008-211). N.p., 18 Sept. 2008. Web. 30 Aug. 2012. 
<http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-211.htm>. 
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the rapid drops that had been experienced.  The emergency ban was put in place to 
“prevent short selling from being used to drive down the share prices of issuers even 
where there is no fundamental basis for a price decline other than general market 
conditions.”2  
A critical component to the short sale ban was the market maker exemption.  
Originally, the market maker exemption was a one day exemption for bona fide market 
making and hedging activities, intended to limit price swings and volatility.  Market 
makers demonstrated their necessity for short selling, and the exemption was extended to 
last the duration of the ban. To maintain the market makers’ ability to do business, the 
exemption was extended for “any person that is a market maker that effects a short sale as 
part of bona fide market making and hedging activity related directly to bona fide market 
making in derivatives on the publicly traded securities of any Included Financial Firm.”3  
The original ban on the short-selling of 797 financial stocks was to terminate on 
October 2
nd
, 2008 at 11:59pm, but new developments came about during the ban.  
According to Reuters, Congress was trying to “hash out a plan to allow the Treasury 
Department to buy distressed assets from financial firms -- a move designed to thaw 
frozen credit markets.”4  Instead of allowing the ban to expire in the midst of these 
negotiations, the SEC extended the ban until 11:59pm on the third business day after the 
enactment of the anticipated legislation.  If legislation faltered or was delayed, the ban 
                                                     
2
 Harmon, Florence E. "SEC Halts Short Selling of Financial Stocks to Protect Investors and Markets." 
(Press Release No. 2008-211). N.p., 18 Sept. 2008. Web. 30 Aug. 2012. 
<http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-211.htm>. 
3
 IBID 
4
 Younglai, Rachelle. "SEC Extends Short Sale Ban to Give Congress Time." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 
02 Oct. 2008. Web. 15 Nov. 2012. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/02/us-financial-sec-extension-
idUSTRE49107K20081002>. 
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was not to extend beyond 11:59pm on October 17
th
, 2008.  This legislation, known to 
most as TARP, Troubled Asset Relief Program, was made into law on October 3.  The 
short sale ban expired after the market closed the following Wednesday, October 8
th
.  In 
all, the ban lasted 14 trading days, spanning from September 19
th
 until October 8
th
, 2008. 
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IV. Hypothesis 
 
I examine two hypotheses in this paper.  First I hypothesize that during the 
emergency short sale ban, lasting from 9/19/2008 until 10/8/2008, there was significant 
substitution into the options market.  When unable to short the underlying stock, 
investors can receive a very similar return through a synthetic short sale.  So it is 
hypothesized that when short sales are banned, substitution into synthetic short sales will 
cause a significant increase in options volume during the ban period.  This trend will 
reverse once the ban is removed. 
 Second, I hypothesize that during the ban period banned stocks without traded 
options will experience abnormally high returns relative to the market because of the lack 
of pessimistic opinions in the marketplace.  Because registered market makers were 
exempt from the short selling ban, they would continue to bring pessimistic opinions to 
the marketplace through hedges.  Only 277 of the 797 stocks subject to the ban had 
tradable options, and therefore short sale hedging by market makers only occurs in those 
277 stocks.  For this reason I hypothesize abnormal returns for the remaining 520 banned 
stocks.
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V. Literature Review 
 
The most relevant previous research is a paper by Figlewski and Webb (1993) 
done before the 2008 short sale ban.  Figlewski and Webb provide empirical evidence 
that the presence of tradable options “contributes to both transactional and informational 
efficiency of the stock market by reducing the effect of constraints on short sales.”1  This 
theory suggests that synthetic short sales are a viable alternative to regular short selling, 
and that the presence of the options required for synthetic shares will reduce the upward 
pricing bias created by short sale restrictions.  Figlewski and Webb also find that the 
presence of tradable options increases the amount of short selling in the underlying 
shares.  This conclusion supports both of my theories, that there will be significant 
substitution to synthetic short sales and the presence of tradable options will affect the 
price impact of a short sale ban. 
 There are numerous studies that assess a short sale ban’s impacts on stock price 
and volatility.  One of the most relevant of these is a study by Battalio and Schultz 
(2011).  They find that the short sale ban is associated with “dramatically increased bid 
ask spreads for options on banned stocks.”2  They also find that synthetic share prices fall 
significantly below actual share prices for stocks subject to the ban.  Finally, and most 
                                                     
1
 Figlewski, Stephen and Gwendolyn P. Webb, 1993, Options, Short Sales, and Market Completeness, The 
Journal of Finance, Volume 43, No. 2.  
2
 Battilio, Robert and Paul Schultz, 2011, Regulatory Uncertainty and Market Liquidity: The 2008 Short 
Sale Ban’s Impact on Equity Option Markets, The Journal of Finance, Volume 66, No. 6. 
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important to my research, is their finding that “prices of the underlying stock become less 
accurate or efficient when bearish investors are prevented from short selling.”3  I intend 
to examine this assertion and find the extent to which stock prices are inflated when 
many of the bearish investors are removed. 
 The same question of short sale bans is examined by Chang, Cheng, and Yu 
(2007) in their research of the Hong Kong market.  Short sales in Hong Kong are only 
permitted on particular stocks so this study revolves around a stock’s addition to the 
permissible list.  Supporting my hypothesis about the U.S. market, they find that “short-
sale constraints tend to cause stock overvaluation.”4  This finding is based on the same 
principle as Battilio and Shultz (2011), that when short-sales are restricted, pessimistic 
investors are forced to sit out of the marketplace.  
 Figlewski (1981) argues the same point: that short selling restrictions are 
detrimental to market quality because they “have an asymmetric impact on investors with 
favorable and unfavorable information.
”5
  If those with positive opinions can buy and 
those with negative opinions can sell short, information differences offset each other in 
the aggregate and the market can establish a fair price.  If those with unfavorable 
opinions must sit out, the market gives disproportional weight to optimistic return 
expectations, thereby creating upward bias in pricing.   
                                                     
3
 Battilio, Robert and Paul Schultz, 2011, Regulatory Uncertainty and Market Liquidity: The 2008 Short 
Sale Ban’s Impact on Equity Option Markets, The Journal of Finance, Volume 66, No. 6. 
4
 Chang, Eric C., Joseph W. Cheng, and Yinghui Yu, 2007, Short Sale Constraints and Price Discovery: 
Evidence from the Hong Kong Market, The Journal of Finance, Volume 62, No. 5. 
5
 Figlewski, Stephen, 1981, The Informational Effects of Restrictions on Short Sales: Some Empirical 
Evidence, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Volume 16, No. 4.  
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A working paper by Bohl, Reher, and Wilfling (2011) studies the short-selling 
constraints on stock price volatility in the German market.  Bohl, Reher, and Wilfling 
find that short-selling restrictions increase the price volatility of the stocks subject to the 
restrictions, because they “limit the ability of the investors to find the fundamental 
price.”6  Lobanova, Hamid, and Prakash7 (2010) also find short sale bans are detrimental 
to market quality because of the decrease in liquidity and increase in volatility.  While a 
reduction in volatility during times of great panic is commonly put forward as the central 
purpose of short selling restrictions, all of these studies just named are contrary to that 
belief.  Most of the opposition to this claim of limiting volatility revolves around the 
“asymmetric impact” discussed by Figlewski (1981) that results from limiting the 
participation of pessimistic investors.  Many believe that this limitation results in a price 
more unstable than before the short selling restrictions. 
 Research on this topic is by no means one-sided.  Appel and Foline (2010), along 
with many others, reach the opposite conclusion: that short-selling restrictions are a great 
tool in times of panic.  In their multi country study of short sale bans, Appel and Foline 
find that short-sale bans improve market liquidity and “generally succeed in lowering 
volatility.”8  They support Diamond and Verrechia9 (1987) and determine that overall 
short-sale bans are a useful tool in times of crisis because of an assumption about investor 
                                                     
6
 Bohl, Martin T., Gerrit Reher, and Bernd Wilfling, 2011, Short-selling Constraints and Stock-return 
Volatility: Empirical Evidence from the German Stock Market, working paper, Westfalische Wilhelms-
Universitat Munster. 
7
 Loanova, Olesya, Shahid S. Hamid, and Arun J. Prakash, 2010, The Impact of Short-Sale Restrictions on 
Volatility, Liquidity, and Market Effeciency: The Evidence from the Short-Sale Ban in the U.S.   < 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571601>. 
8
 Appel, Ian and Caroline Fohlin, 2010, “Shooting the Messenger?” The Impact of Short Sale Bans in 
Times of Crisis, working paper, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. 
9
 Diamond, Douglas W. and Robert E. Verrecchia, 1987, Constraints on short selling-selling and asset price 
adjustment to private information, Journal of Financial Economics, 18, 277-311. 
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rationale. Diamond and Verrechia argue that if all investors are rational, short sale bans 
should not have an effect on price.  When short sales are banned, the reaction to negative 
information will simply be slower than the reaction to positive information but the 
negative price movements will still take effect.  Bailey and Zheng
10
 (2011) also find that 
short selling restrictions have stabilizing effects on prices during the periods of crisis or 
panic. 
A few studies assess the differing impacts on stocks with or without tradable 
options, or the differing impacts associated with company size, which is often highly 
correlated to the presence of tradable options.  Beber and Pagano (2011) studied short-
selling constraints around the world.  They used panel data to determine that bans are 
harmful to liquidity, “particularly for stocks with small capitalization and no listed 
options.” 11   This assertion suggests that the presence of synthetic short sales is a 
significant factor determining liquidity during times of restrictions. 
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2011) studied the 2008 ban in the U.S. and the effect 
on market quality, as measured by bid ask spread, price impacts and intraday volatility.  
They find that the effects are highly concentrated in larger stocks.  “Shorting activity in 
large-cap stocks subject to the ban drops by about 77%.”12   Boehmer, Jones and Zhang 
ascertain that the remaining short sales are largely market-making firms that are exempt 
                                                     
10
 Bailey, Warren and Lin Zheng, 2012, Banks, Bears, and the Financial Crisis, Journal of Financial 
Services Research, forthcoming. 
11
 Beber, Alessandro and Marco Pagno, 2011, Short-Selling Bans around the World: Evidence from the 
2007-09 Crisis, The Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
12
 Boehmer, Ekkehart, Charles M. Jones, and Xiaoyan Zhang, 2011, Shackling Short Sellers: The 2008 
Shorting Ban, working paper, Mays Business School, Texas A&M University. 
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from the restrictions and that even these market makers suffered severely increased costs 
associated with shorting. 
Hayunga, Holowczak, Lung, and Nishikawa (2012) study the divergence between 
equity assets and option implied synthetic shares.  They find a “consistently positive 
relation between the level of stock mispricing and violations in the upper-boundary 
condition using derivatives.” 13 
  Figlewski and Webb (1993) summarize all of these theories related to my 
study in their paper written prior to the 2008 ban. 
Introducing options trading can potentially reduce or even 
eliminate the informational effect of short sales constraints, by 
providing alternative trading strategies for investors with 
unfavorable information to sell short indirectly.  For example, 
when a put is purchased from an options market maker he will 
normally hedge by shorting the stock, and perhaps buying a call 
also to turn the position into a reverse arbitrage.  The put buyer’s 
desire to sell the stock is transformed through the options market 
into an actual short sale by a market professional who faces the 
lowest cost and fewest constraints.  Thus the increase in 
transactional efficiency makes possible an increase in 
informational efficiency as well.
14
 
                                                     
13
 Hayunga K. Darren, Richard D. Holowczak, Peter P. Lung, and Takeshi Nishikawa, 2011, Derivatives 
Traders’ Reaction to Mispricing in the Underlying Equity, Journal of Banking & Finance.   
14
 Figlewski, Stephen and Gwendolyn P. Webb, 1993, Options, Short Sales, and Market Completeness, The 
Journal of Finance, Volume 43, No. 2.  
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In general, existing literature such as the above supports my theory that a short sale ban 
will cause substitution to the options market and that the presence of tradable options will 
mitigate the effect of the ban by providing an outlet for pessimistic investors.
22 
 
 
VI. Data 
 
 The time period for this study extends from January 1
st
, 2008 until December 31
st
 
2008.  This time is then divided into three sub categories: pre ban, January 1
st
 through 
September 18
th
, during ban, September 19
th
 through October 8
th
, and post ban, October 
9
th
 through December 31
st
. 
 Securities in this study are divided into three groups; banned stocks with tradable 
options (277), banned stocks without tradable options (520), and the portion of the S&P 
500 that was not subject to the ban (441) which is to be used as a control group.  Daily 
stock prices for the entire length of the study were downloaded from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. 
 Put and call volumes were also collected for the 277 banned stocks with exchange 
traded options and for the S&P 500 stocks with exchange traded options.  Due to the time 
period of this study, this information was no longer available on Bloomberg, so it was 
acquired from Gregory Cohen (NYU ’09), who had previously downloaded the 
information from a Bloomberg terminal. 
 Information regarding the sector of the financial industry for each of the stocks 
subject to the ban was downloaded from a Bloomberg terminal. 
23 
 
 
VII. Methodology 
 
 There are two analyses in this study.  The first analysis is of option volume.  I 
collected daily put and call volume for all 277 banned stocks with exchange traded 
options and for the non-banned S&P 500 stocks.  I then aggregated the daily volumes to 
create a total daily volume for both puts and calls of each category.  Average daily 
volume for the study period (full year 2008) is then determined for each of the two 
categories.  Next the average put and call volume is determined for each of the three 
periods into which the study is divided: pre-ban, ban, and post-ban.  These averages are 
then compared to the category’s year average to determine abnormal volume, defined as 
average period volume in excess of average yearly volume.  T tests are then used to 
determine if the daily volumes are statistically different from one another from one 
period to the next.  This is done for both banned stocks with traded options and for non-
banned S&P 500 stocks. 
 The second analysis in this paper is of stock returns.  Stock prices were gathered 
for three categories: banned stocks with traded options, banned stocks without traded 
options, and the non-banned S&P 500 stocks.  Holding period returns are calculated for 
each individual stock in each of the three categories.  As with the options analysis there 
are four holding periods in this study, the full year of 2008, the pre ban period, the ban 
period and the post ban period.  Individual holding period returns are then aggregated for 
24 
 
 
 
each group to determine the return of each of the three categories during each holding 
period.  All stocks are weighted equally, to give an average return, rather than a 
theoretical portfolio consisting of each group.  The returns of each category are then 
compared to the other returns of the same holding period thereby determining excess 
return of one category over another category.  T Tests are used to determine if the 
holding period returns of the three categories have a statistically significant difference 
from one another. 
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VIII. Results 
i. Options Volume 
 
 This analysis examines the hypothesis that during the short sale ban, banned 
stocks with traded options would experience abnormally high options volume.  Table 1 
shows the average daily volume during each period for the 277 banned stocks with 
tradable options.  Each period is then broken down into call volume, put volume, and 
total options volume.  The options volume of the S&P 500 is also given as a control.   
During the sample period, the S&P 500 saw total options volume changes of 
+1.35%, +6.93% and -5.87% before, during and after the ban. T tests show that none of 
these differences for total options volume are statistically significant from one another at 
any reasonable level.  It can be concluded that during the period examined by this study, 
the year 2008, the S&P 500 did not experience any significant volume shifts in total 
options traded arising from the short sale ban extending from September 19
th
 2008 until 
October 8
th
 2008. 
There is one period during the study that shows a statistical difference in traded 
volume of strictly call option for the S&P 500.  The period after the ban, from October 9
th
 
until December 31
st
 shows a significant difference in call volume but not put volume.  
The post ban period experienced an abnormal decrease of 9.63% in traded call volume.  
This difference is statistically different from the ban period at the 10% significance level 
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and statistically different from the pre ban period at the 1% level.  This small significant 
difference for strictly call options in one period is hardly substantial.  For the most part it 
is observed that options volume in the non-banned S&P 500 is more or less constant. 
As Figure 1 shows, the banned stocks with tradable options experienced abnormal 
volume of +27.47% during the fourteen day ban period.  T-Tests show this difference to 
be statistically significant from the pre ban period at the 5% level and different from the 
post ban period at the 1% level.  After the ban period, when short sales were permitted 
again, the formerly banned stocks saw a decrease in daily volume of -15.39% when 
compared to the year’s average.  This difference is significantly different from either 
period at the 1% level. 
Before the ban, put volume on banned stocks appeared to be 5% above the year’s 
average and 10% above the year’s average during the ban.  However it was found that 
these numbers for put volume before the ban and during the ban are not statistically 
different from one another.  Put volume on the S&P 500 was in line with the year average 
before the ban and 10% higher after.  As expected, this difference is not statistically 
significant because the non-banned S&P 500 stocks were not affected by the short sale 
ban.   
After the ban, put volume on the banned stocks was 19.42% lower than average 
for the remainder of the year.  This difference is significantly different from either of the 
other periods at any level.  Not surprisingly, the non-banned S&P 500 stocks did not 
experience any significant change in put volume following the removal of the short sale 
ban. 
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As Figure 2 shows, call volume on the banned stocks before the ban was equal to 
the yearly average.  During the ban, average volume was 46.57% higher than average.  
This difference is statistically significant at any level.  Following the removal of the ban 
average call volume fell to 10.82% below average.  This difference is also significant at 
any level.  As Table 1 and Figure 3 show, the average number of contracts per day during 
the ban is 1,076,540.  After the ban is lifted average call contracts per day fall to 654,966.  
Following the removal of the ban call volume on the S&P 500 also fell from 4.41% 
above average to 9.57% below average.  This difference is significant at the 10% level. 
As stated previously, my first hypothesis is that a ban on short sales results in 
substitution to the options market, specifically through synthetic short sales.  Options 
volume during the ban was 27.47% higher than the yearly average.  This strongly 
suggests that a great deal of substitution did indeed take place.  However, the second 
aspect of my first hypothesis is that investors would use synthetic short sales as the 
substitute.  A fundamental requirement to creating a synthetic short position is that the 
investor must hold an equal number of short calls as long puts; this strategy is what 
creates a payoff nearly identical to a real short position.  During the ban period there was 
a 46.57% abnormal increase in call volume.  Puts appeared to experience 10.62% positive 
abnormal volume but upon closer examination the put volume during the ban was not 
statistically different from the put volume prior to the ban.  This is very surprising, and it 
is unclear why call volume would see a significant increase during the ban but not put 
volume.  The 27.47% increase in options volume during the ban, which was statistically 
significant, was almost entirely due to an increase in call volume.  It is clear that when 
short sales were banned there was significant substitution into the options market.  That 
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substitution appears to be however into call options, not synthetic short sales.  Massive 
substitution to synthetic short sales would point toward a one-for-one increase in both 
puts and calls, which was not the case.  There was still an upward observational trend in 
put volume so I believe a large number of synthetic short sales still took place, but this 
does not appear to be where the vast majority of the substitution took place. 
It is relevant to note that looking back the investors who bought call options 
during the ban and exercised them after the ban received the greatest payoff.  However, 
investors buying call options are not the negative investors being prevented from short 
selling the stock.  A negative investor would have sold calls hoping to benefit from a 
decrease in stock price. 
ii. Stock Returns 
 
 This analysis evaluates the hypothesis that stocks subject to the short-sale ban that 
did not have tradable options would experience abnormally high returns during the ban 
period.  These returns would be abnormally high compared with both banned stocks with 
traded options and with non-banned S&P 500 stocks. 
 Table 2 shows the returns over the four periods relevant to this study: the three 
periods previously defined as pre ban, during the ban and post ban as well as the year in 
its entirety.  The returns for these four periods are shown for the three separate groups: 
banned stocks with tradable options, banned stocks without tradable options, and non-
banned S&P 500 stocks. 
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 For the entire sample period, the year 2008, the return on the control group, the 
non-banned S&P 500, was -37.61%.  This is compared with -31.02% and -35.54% for 
banned stocks with and without traded options respectively.  T tests show that the full 
year returns of the banned stocks with and without traded options are not statistically 
different from one another.  Returns for banned stocks without options and the non-
banned S&P 500 are not statistically different at any level either.  The full year returns 
for the banned stocks with traded options and the S&P 500 are significantly different at 
the 5% level. 
The ban lasted 14 trading days, during which the non-banned S&P 500 returned   
-23.70% with an average of -1.64% per day.  Similarly, the banned stocks with tradable 
options returned -25.32% with an average of -1.42% per day.  It is hypothesized that the 
short sale ban will have a minimal effect on the returns of banned stocks with traded 
options.  T tests show that the -25.32% return by the banned stocks with tradable options 
is not statistically different from the non-banned S&P 500 return of -23.70%.  This is a 
very clear lack of impact from the short sale ban.  Throughout the ban period the banned 
stocks with traded options appear to be under the same price pressures that the non-
banned S&P 500 stocks are under.  The S&P stocks are still subject to regular short sale 
pressure coming from pessimistic investors, while the pessimistic investors of the banned 
stocks cannot sell short therefore the pessimistic opinions of the investors who do not 
already own the stock must be getting to the marketplace indirectly, and putting the 
appropriate downward pressure on the stock price.   
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The apparent presence of pessimistic investors in the market for banned stocks 
with tradable options can be explained by the market maker exemption.  To maintain 
market liquidity, registered market makers were allowed to continue to short the 
underlying stock for the 797 stocks covered by the ban.  These were not speculative bets; 
these were shorts made to hedge other exposures.  As we saw in the study of options 
volume, when the ban was placed, investors were forced to move their pessimistic 
opinions into the options market as they could no longer short the stock themselves.  The 
market maker then brings the negative opinions to marketplace in the form of a hedge 
and thus maintains the true price.  And so these stocks where substitution to options is 
possible stay roughly in line with the non-banned S&P 500.  
It is hypothesized that the ban will have the greatest effect on banned stocks 
without tradable options.  These stocks returned -15.74% and an average of -.56% per 
day.  This is compared with -25.32% for the banned stocks with options and -23.70% for 
the non-banned S&P 500.  T tests show that the ban period returns for the banned stocks 
without traded options are significantly different from the returns of either of the other 
groups at any significance level. 
The banned stocks without tradable options are not subject to the same series of 
events that transfers pessimistic investor opinions from the options market to the stock 
price.  Because there is no alternative investment vehicle for the pessimistic investors 
during the ban, banned stocks without tradable options experienced returns roughly 10% 
higher than their peers with tradable options, and 8% higher than the non-banned S&P 
500.   
31 
 
 
 
The results of the options volume analysis do not necessarily point to synthetic 
short sales as the primary reason for the increase in options volume.  However the same 
series of events could still be the reason for the abnormal price increase.  If an investor 
expresses their pessimistic opinions about the stock by selling calls, rather than 
establishing a full synthetic short position, the market maker who now holds these calls, 
could still hedge this exposure with a short sale under the rules of the short sale ban.  
Depending on the amount the market maker chooses to hedge, this could amount to a 
speculative bet by the market maker.  Speculative bets are what the short sale ban 
intended to eliminate.  
After the ban expired this trend was quickly reversed.  In the period from October 
9
th
 until December 31
st
, the non-banned S&P 500 returned -4.68% and the banned stocks 
with tradable options actually gained 9.53%.  The banned stocks without tradable options 
returned -7.93% during this period.  T tests show that the returns of the banned stocks 
without tradable options and the S&P 500 are not significantly different from one 
another.  The returns of the banned stocks with traded options are significantly different 
from either of the other groups at the 1% level.  This is consistent with research done by 
Autore, Billingsley, and Kovacs (2011) who find a “valuation reversal whereby stocks 
with higher abnormal returns at the onset of the ban have lower abnormal returns at its 
removal.”1  On average, the stocks without traded options had higher abnormal returns 
before the ban, and lower abnormal returns after. 
                                                     
1
 Autore, Don M., Randall S. Billingsley, and Tunde Kovacs, 2011, The 2008 Short Sale Ban: Liquidity, 
Dispersion of Opinion, and the Cross-section of Returns of U.S. Financial Stocks working paper, Florida 
State University.  
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At the same time as the lifting of the ban, Federal bailout packages were 
announced.  Both of these were good news for the financial stocks covered by the ban.  
The banned stocks with traded options had lost 25.32% during the last 14 trading days.  
The good news put significant upward pressure on the low stock prices and this group 
experienced the only positive returns witnessed in any period by any group during this 
study.  It may seem that the sign of confidence inherent in the lifting of the ban is of little 
significance when compared to a Federal bailout worth $700.  However, Autore, 
Billingsley, and Kovacs’ (2011) determined that their findings regarding the valuation 
reversal “are robust when [they] control for firms most affected by TARP.”2 
The banned stocks without traded options did not benefit from this news in the 
same way their peers with traded options did.  There are two possible explanations of this 
discrepancy.  The banned stocks without traded options came out of the ban period 
overvalued, not undervalued, so the good news simply eased already negative opinions 
and stopped a stock price plummet.  The second explanation is that the banned stocks 
without traded options were in general associated with smaller companies than stocks 
with traded options as company size is often an indicator of whether or not a stock will 
have traded options.  Further inspection reveals that the average market capitalization of 
the banned stocks with traded options is $7,017,200 while the average market 
capitalization of the banned stocks without traded options is only $729,381.  Further 
detail regarding market capitalization is given in Figure 5.  The Federal bailouts were for 
companies deemed “too big to fail”.  The smaller companies would only be indirect 
                                                     
2
 Autore, Don M., Randall S. Billingsley, and Tunde Kovacs, 2011, The 2008 Short Sale Ban: Liquidity, 
Dispersion of Opinion, and the Cross-section of Returns of U.S. Financial Stocks working paper, Florida 
State University.  
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beneficiaries of this money and thus the announcement was of less significance to them, 
and consequently of less significance to their stock price. 
Banned stocks both with and without traded options were also separated into 
sectors within the financial industry.  According to Bloomberg, the banned stocks with 
options consist mostly of banks and insurance while the banned stocks without options 
consist mostly of banks and savings and loans.  Particular sector weightings did not 
appear to have a significant impact on the holding period returns.  Information regarding 
sector composition of the two groups can be found in Table 3. 
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IX. Conclusion 
 
 The empirical findings of this paper support the hypothesis that a ban on short 
sales causes significant substitution into the derivatives market.  The results are in line 
with what Figlewski and Webb
1
 (1993) would expect based on their study conducted 
more than a decade before the ban.  They predict that the presence of options reduces the 
upward pricing bias created by a short sale ban.  The upward pricing bias is clear in this 
study: the banned stocks without traded options experienced returns roughly 12% higher 
that the S&P 500. It is also clear that the presence of options mitigate this upward bias: 
the stocks with traded options experienced returns equal to the non-banned S&P 500.  
There is not enough evidence to determine that investor substitution was into synthetic 
short sales specifically, as put volume did not see a significant increase in volume.  
Further research could prove or disprove this using access to specific trades placed on 
each day, rather than aggregate volume. 
 The SEC’s short sale ban appears to have been rendered useless.  For stocks with 
tradable options, the positive effect which is the intended result of the ban never comes as 
the negative opinions are transferred through the market maker.  For banned stocks 
without traded options, the positive effect only lasts as long as the ban.  Consistent with 
                                                     
1
 Figlewski, Stephen and Gwendolyn P. Webb, 1993, Options, Short Sales, and Market Completeness, The 
Journal of Finance, Volume 43, No. 2.  
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Autore, Billingsley, and Kovacs
2
 (2011), I find that positive abnormal returns during the 
ban were quickly reversed after its removal.  The group that was positively affected by 
the ban, the banned stocks without traded options, do not experience returns above S&P 
500 for the year.  The banned stocks with options, which were even with the S&P 500 
through the ban, did experience an annual return roughly 6.6% higher than the S&P 500, 
but this return came after a $700 billion bailout fund.  Without so many exemptions for 
market makers perhaps the ban could have had the intended effect, but hindering market 
maker’s ability to hedge would have resulted in entirely different problems.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2
 Autore, Don M., Randall S. Billingsley, and Tunde Kovacs, 2011, The 2008 Short Sale Ban: Liquidity, 
Dispersion of Opinion, and the Cross-section of Returns of U.S. Financial Stocks working paper, Florida 
State University.  
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XI. Appendix 
 
Table 1: Options Volume 
This table shows average put and call volumes for each of the four periods in the study.  Percentages given are the period volume in 
relation to the yearly average for each item.  Statistical significance is given by ***, **, and * meaning 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Banned Stocks With Traded Options Non-banned S&P 500 
 
Average Daily Volume Put Call Total Put Call Total 
Before Ban       877,196           733,483      1,610,679    2,344,022     2,836,065    5,180,088  
During Ban       920,596        1,076,540      1,997,136    2,582,875     2,882,450    5,465,325  
After Ban       670,648           654,966      1,325,614    2,314,513     2,496,597    4,811,110  
Total Period       832,247           734,466      1,566,713    2,350,474     2,760,809    5,111,284  
           
Difference from Yearly Average Put Call Total Put Call Total 
Before Ban 5.40% -0.13% 2.81% 8.48% 2.73% 1.35% 
During Ban 10.62% 46.57%*** 27.47%** 9.89% 4.41% 6.93% 
After Ban -19.42%*** -10.82%*** -15.39%*** -1.53% -9.57%* -5.87% 
Total Period 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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Figure 1: Abnormal Options Volume 
This Figure shows aggregate abnormal put and call volume for banned stocks compared with aggregate abnormal put and call 
volume for non-banned S&P 500 stocks.  Abnormal volume is defined as the volume above the daily average for the full year. 
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Figure 2: Abnormal Put and Call Volume for Banned Stocks 
This figure shows the abnormal put and call volume experienced by the banned stocks before, during, and after the ban on short 
sales.  Abnormal volume is defined as volume above the yearly average. 
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Figure 3: Average Daily Put and Call Volume 
This figure shows the average daily put and call volume for each of the four periods, before the ban (1/2/08 – 9/18/08), during the 
ban      (9/19/08 – 10/8/08), and after the ban (10/9/08 – 12/31/08). 
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Table 2: Holding Period Returns 
This table displays the holding period returns for the categories of stocks: banned stocks with traded options, banned stocks without 
traded options, and the non-banned S&P 500 control group.  Holding period returns are given for four periods: before ban, during 
ban, after ban, and the full year of 2008.  Differences are given for the two groups of banned stocks against the non-banned S&P 
500 that hence was unaffected by the ban.  The difference between the two banned groups is also given to highlight how the ban 
affects the two groups differently.  Statistical significance is given by ***, **, and * meaning 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 Before Ban During Ban After Ban Entire Period 
 (2/1/08 – 9/18/08) (9/19/08 – 10/8/09) (10/9/08 – 12/31/08) (2/1/08 – 12/31/08) 
Non-banned S&P 500 -11.07% -23.70% -4.68% -37.61% 
Banned Stocks With Traded 
Options -8.46% -25.32% 9.53% -31.02% 
Banned Stocks Without Traded 
Options -17.53% -15.74% -7.93% -35.54% 
Difference:     
Banned With Options – Non-
banned S&P 500 2.61% -1.63% 14.21%*** 6.59%** 
Banned Without Options – Non 
Banned S&P 500 -6.45%*** 7.95%*** -3.25% 2.07% 
Banned Without Options – 
Banned With Options -9.07%*** 9.58%*** -17.46%*** -4.52% 
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Figure 4: Abnormal Holding Period Returns  
This figure gives the return over the non-banned S&P 500 during each of the four holding periods.  A 0% return on this graph is a 
return exactly equal to the return on the non-banned S&P 500 for the holding period.  This is done to eliminate overall market 
fluctuations during the periods and isolate the effects felt by the short sale ban. 
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Figure 5: Distribution by Market Capitalization 
This figure shows the distribution by market capitalization of the two groups of banned stocks.  Average market capitalization for 
the banned stocks with options is $7,017,200 and $729,381 for the banned stocks without options.  Market capitalization is 
determined on September 18
th
, 2008, the day the ban was announced. 
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Table 3: Financial Sector Distribution 
This table shows the distribution amongst various sectors of the financial industry for both of the groups of banned stocks.  Sector 
information is listed exactly as it was pulled from Bloomberg. 
 
Banned Stocks with Traded Options   Banned Stocks without Traded Options 
Banks 108 39%   Asset Allocation Fund 1 0% 
Commercial Services 2 1%   Banks 290 56% 
Diversified Finan Serv 42 15%   Closed-end Funds 1 0% 
Electric 1 0%   Commercial Services 2 0% 
Equity Fund 1 0%   Diversified Finan Serv 29 6% 
Healthcare-Services 14 5%   Engineering&Construction 1 0% 
Holding Companies-Divers 1 0%   Equity Fund 1 0% 
Insurance 81 29%   Holding Companies-Divers 5 1% 
Investment Companies 3 1%   Home Builders 1 0% 
Pipelines 1 0%   Insurance 54 10% 
Private Equity 2 1%   Internet 2 0% 
Savings&Loans 19 7%   Investment Companies 2 0% 
Water 1 0%   Pipelines 1 0% 
      REITS 1 0% 
      Savings&Loans 126 24% 
        Software 1 0% 
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Figure 6: Option Volume Trends over Time 
This figure shows the trend in daily options volume for puts and calls over the course of the year. 
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Figure 7: Daily Stock Returns over Time 
This figure shows the daily return trend over the course of the year.  This is expressed along a timeline, rather than in the sub 
periods that this study is broken down into. 
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Timeline 1: 2008 Short Sale Ban and Preceding Months 
This timeline presents a linear representation of the 2008 short sale ban and the events 
that lead to its enactment.  Timeline credit to Van T. Nguyen and Alex P. Tang. 
 
Date Event Description 
Sunday, March 14, 2008 Bear Steams collapsed and was acquired by JP 
Morgan Chase 
Tuesday, July 15, 2008 The SEC announced an emergency order and 
said it would tighten short-selling rules for 19 
financial firms by requiring traders to "pre-
borrow" stocks before initiating a so-called 
short-sale. 
Tuesday, July 30, 2008 The SEC extended the emergency limit on short-
sales to Tuesday, August 12, 2008. 
Saturday, September 6, 2008 The government took control of the troubled 
mortgage giants Fannie and Freddie Mac. 
Friday, September 12,2008 The Federal Reserve Bank (New York) called an 
emergency meeting of the heads of major 
financial institutions to discuss the fate of 
Lehman Brothers, which had suffered a rapid 
plunge in its stock prices. 
Tuesday, September 16, 2008 The US government seized control of the AIG in 
an $85 billion deal. 
Wednesday, September 17, 
2008 
Stock prices of major financial institutions 
plummeted in the wake of the government 
decision to take over the AIG. 
Thursday, September 18, 
2008 
The SEC announced that it was considering a 
temporary ban of some or all short-selling. 
Friday, September 19, 2008 The SEC issued a temporary ban on short-sales 
of 799 financial stocks. Also required 
institutional money managers to report their new 
short sales of certain publicly traded securities. 
The ban was set to expire on Thursday, October 
2. 
Wednesday. October 1, 2008 The SEC said that it was extending the ban to no 
later than Friday, October 17. 
Friday, October 3, 2008 The House voted 263-171 to enact the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. 
Wednesday, October 8, 2008 The short-sale ban expired. 
 
49 
 
 
 
XII. Complete List of Banned Stocks 
 
Banned Stocks with Tradable Options  
 NAME INDUSTRY GROUP 
ABK US Equity AMBAC FINANCIAL GROUP INC Insurance 
ACE US Equity ACE LTD Insurance 
ACGL US Equity ARCH CAPITAL GROUP LTD Insurance 
ADVNB US Equity ADVANTA CORP-CLASS B Diversified Finan Serv 
AEG US Equity AEGON N.V.-NY REG SHR Insurance 
AEL US Equity AMERICAN EQUITY INVT LIFE HL Insurance 
AET US Equity AETNA INC Healthcare-Services 
AF US Equity ASTORIA FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
AFG US Equity AMERICAN FINANCIAL GROUP INC Insurance 
AFL US Equity AFLAC INC Insurance 
AGII US Equity ARGO GROUP INTERNATIONAL Insurance 
AGO US Equity ASSURED GUARANTY LTD Insurance 
AGP US Equity AMERIGROUP CORP Healthcare-Services 
AHL US Equity ASPEN INSURANCE HOLDINGS LTD Insurance 
AIB US Equity ALLIED IRISH BANKS PLC Banks 
AIG US Equity AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP Insurance 
AINV US Equity APOLLO INVESTMENT CORP Investment Companies 
AIZ US Equity ASSURANT INC Insurance 
ALL US Equity ALLSTATE CORP Insurance 
AMFI US Equity AMCORE FINANCIAL INC Banks 
AMG US Equity AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP Diversified Finan Serv 
AMP US Equity AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC Diversified Finan Serv 
AMSF US Equity AMERISAFE INC Insurance 
AMTD US Equity TD AMERITRADE HOLDING CORP Diversified Finan Serv 
AOC US Equity AON CORP Insurance 
ASFI US Equity ASTA FUNDING INC Diversified Finan Serv 
AWH US Equity ALLIED WORLD ASSURANCE CO Insurance 
AXA US Equity AXA -SPONS ADR Insurance 
AXS US Equity AXIS CAPITAL HOLDINGS LTD Insurance 
BAC US Equity BANK OF AMERICA CORP Banks 
BANR US Equity BANNER CORPORATION Banks 
BBT US Equity BB&T CORP Banks 
BBX US Equity BBX CAPITAL CORP-A Savings&Loans 
BCS US Equity BARCLAYS PLC-SPONS ADR Banks 
BEN US Equity FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC Diversified Finan Serv 
BK US Equity BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP Banks 
BKMU US Equity BANK MUTUAL CORP Savings&Loans 
BKUNA US Equity BANKUNITED FINANCIAL CORP-A Banks 
BNS US Equity BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA Banks 
BOH US Equity BANK OF HAWAII CORP Banks 
BOKF US Equity BOK FINANCIAL CORPORATION Banks 
BPFH US Equity BOSTON PRIVATE FINL HOLDING Banks 
BRKL US Equity BROOKLINE BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
BUSE US Equity FIRST BUSEY CORP Banks 
BX US Equity BLACKSTONE GROUP LP/THE Private Equity 
BXS US Equity BANCORPSOUTH INC Banks 
C US Equity CITIGROUP INC Banks 
CACB US Equity CASCADE BANCORP Banks 
CATY US Equity CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP Banks 
CB US Equity CHUBB CORP Insurance 
CBON US Equity COMMUNITY BANCORP Banks 
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CBU US Equity COMMUNITY BANK SYSTEM INC Banks 
CFFN US Equity CAPITOL FEDERAL FINANCIAL IN Savings&Loans 
CFR US Equity CULLEN/FROST BANKERS INC Banks 
CHCO US Equity CITY HOLDING CO Banks 
CHFC US Equity CHEMICAL FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
CI US Equity CIGNA CORP Healthcare-Services 
CIA US Equity CITIZENS INC Insurance 
CINF US Equity CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORP Insurance 
CLMS US Equity CALAMOS ASSET MANAGEMENT-A Diversified Finan Serv 
CMA US Equity COMERICA INC Banks 
CME US Equity CME GROUP INC Diversified Finan Serv 
CNA US Equity CNA FINANCIAL CORP Insurance 
CNB US Equity COLONIAL BANCGROUP INC Banks 
CNC US Equity CENTENE CORP Healthcare-Services 
CNO US Equity CNO FINANCIAL GROUP INC Insurance 
CNS US Equity COHEN & STEERS INC Diversified Finan Serv 
COLB US Equity COLUMBIA BANKING SYSTEM INC Banks 
CORS US Equity CORUS BANKSHARES INC Banks 
CPF US Equity CENTRAL PACIFIC FINANCIAL CO Banks 
CRBC US Equity CITIZENS REPUBLIC BANCORP IN Banks 
CVBF US Equity CVB FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
CVH US Equity COVENTRY HEALTH CARE INC Healthcare-Services 
DB US Equity DEUTSCHE BANK AG-REGISTERED Banks 
DCOM US Equity DIME COMMUNITY BANCSHARES Savings&Loans 
DFG US Equity DELPHI FINANCIAL GROUP-CL A Insurance 
DLLR US Equity DFC GLOBAL CORP Diversified Finan Serv 
ENH US Equity ENDURANCE SPECIALTY HOLDINGS Insurance 
ETFC US Equity E*TRADE FINANCIAL CORP Diversified Finan Serv 
EV US Equity EATON VANCE CORP Diversified Finan Serv 
EVR US Equity EVERCORE PARTNERS INC-CL A Diversified Finan Serv 
EWBC US Equity EAST WEST BANCORP INC Banks 
FAF US Equity FIRST AMERICAN FINANCIAL Insurance 
FBC US Equity FLAGSTAR BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
FBP US Equity FIRST BANCORP PUERTO RICO Banks 
FFBC US Equity FIRST FINANCIAL BANCORP Banks 
FFH US Equity FAIRFAX FINANCIAL HLDGS LTD Insurance 
FFIN US Equity FIRST FINL BANKSHARES INC Banks 
FFNW US Equity FIRST FINANCIAL NORTHWEST Savings&Loans 
FHN US Equity FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP Banks 
FIG US Equity FORTRESS INVESTMENT GRP-CL A Private Equity 
FII US Equity FEDERATED INVESTORS INC-CL B Diversified Finan Serv 
FMBI US Equity FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP INC/IL Banks 
FMER US Equity FIRSTMERIT CORP Banks 
FNB US Equity FNB CORP Banks 
FNFG US Equity FIRST NIAGARA FINANCIAL GRP Savings&Loans 
FNM US Equity FANNIE MAE Diversified Finan Serv 
FRE US Equity FREDDIE MAC Diversified Finan Serv 
FTBK US Equity FRONTIER FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
FULT US Equity FULTON FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
GBCI US Equity GLACIER BANCORP INC Banks 
GBNK US Equity GUARANTY BANCORP Banks 
GCA US Equity GLOBAL CASH ACCESS HOLDINGS Commercial Services 
GFIG US Equity GFI GROUP INC Diversified Finan Serv 
GHL US Equity GREENHILL & CO INC Diversified Finan Serv 
GLRE US Equity GREENLIGHT CAPITAL RE LTD-A Insurance 
GNW US Equity GENWORTH FINANCIAL INC-CL A Insurance 
GROW US Equity U.S. GLOBAL INVESTORS INC-A Diversified Finan Serv 
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GS US Equity GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC Banks 
GTS US Equity TRIPLE-S MANAGEMENT CORP-B Healthcare-Services 
HAFC US Equity HANMI FINANCIAL CORPORATION Banks 
HBAN US Equity HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INC Banks 
HBHC US Equity HANCOCK HOLDING CO Banks 
HCBK US Equity HUDSON CITY BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
HCC US Equity HCC INSURANCE HOLDINGS INC Insurance 
HMN US Equity HORACE MANN EDUCATORS Insurance 
HNBC US Equity HARLEYSVILLE NATIONAL CORP Banks 
HNT US Equity HEALTH NET INC Healthcare-Services 
HS US Equity HEALTHSPRING INC Healthcare-Services 
HTH US Equity HILLTOP HOLDINGS INC Insurance 
HUM US Equity HUMANA INC Healthcare-Services 
IBKC US Equity IBERIABANK CORP Banks 
IBKR US Equity INTERACTIVE BROKERS GRO-CL A Diversified Finan Serv 
IBOC US Equity INTERNATIONAL BANCSHARES CRP Banks 
ICE US Equity INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE INC Diversified Finan Serv 
INDB US Equity INDEPENDENT BANK CORP/MA Banks 
ING US Equity ING GROEP N.V.-SPONSORED ADR Insurance 
IPCC US Equity INFINITY PROPERTY & CASUALTY Insurance 
IPCR US Equity IPC HOLDINGS LTD Insurance 
ITC US Equity ITC HOLDINGS CORP Electric 
ITG US Equity INVESTMENT TECHNOLOGY GROUP Diversified Finan Serv 
JEF US Equity JEFFERIES GROUP INC Diversified Finan Serv 
JNS US Equity JANUS CAPITAL GROUP INC Diversified Finan Serv 
JPM US Equity JPMORGAN CHASE & CO Banks 
KEY US Equity KEYCORP Banks 
L US Equity LOEWS CORP Insurance 
LAB US Equity LABRANCHE & CO INC Diversified Finan Serv 
LAZ US Equity LAZARD LTD-CL A Diversified Finan Serv 
LFC US Equity CHINA LIFE INSURANCE CO-ADR Insurance 
LNC US Equity LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP Insurance 
LUK US Equity LEUCADIA NATIONAL CORP Holding Companies-Divers 
LYG US Equity LLOYDS BANKING GROUP PLC-ADR Banks 
MBFI US Equity MB FINANCIAL INC Banks 
MBI US Equity MBIA INC Insurance 
MCGC US Equity MCG CAPITAL CORP Investment Companies 
MCY US Equity MERCURY GENERAL CORP Insurance 
MF US Equity MF GLOBAL HOLDINGS LTD Diversified Finan Serv 
MFC US Equity MANULIFE FINANCIAL CORP Insurance 
MI US Equity MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP Banks 
MIG US Equity MEADOWBROOK INSURANCE GROUP Insurance 
MOH US Equity MOLINA HEALTHCARE INC Healthcare-Services 
MORN US Equity MORNINGSTAR INC Commercial Services 
MRH US Equity MONTPELIER RE HOLDINGS LTD Insurance 
MS US Equity MORGAN STANLEY Banks 
MTG US Equity MGIC INVESTMENT CORP Insurance 
MTU US Equity MITSUBISHI UFJ FINL GRP-ADR Banks 
MXGL US Equity MAX CAPITAL GROUP LTD Insurance 
NAL US Equity NEWALLIANCE BANCSHARES INC Savings&Loans 
NARA US Equity NARA BANCORP INC Banks 
NAVG US Equity NAVIGATORS GROUP INC Insurance 
NBTB US Equity N B T BANCORP INC Banks 
NDAQ US Equity NASDAQ OMX GROUP/THE Diversified Finan Serv 
NFS US Equity NATIONWIDE FINANCIAL SERV- A Insurance 
NITE US Equity KNIGHT CAPITAL GROUP INC-A Diversified Finan Serv 
NMR US Equity NOMURA HOLDINGS INC-ADR Diversified Finan Serv 
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NPBC US Equity NATL PENN BCSHS INC Banks 
NSH US Equity NUSTAR GP HOLDINGS LLC Pipelines 
NTRS US Equity NORTHERN TRUST CORP Banks 
NWSB US Equity NORTHWEST BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
NYB US Equity NEW YORK COMMUNITY BANCORP Savings&Loans 
NYX US Equity NYSE EURONEXT Diversified Finan Serv 
OFG US Equity ORIENTAL FINANCIAL GROUP Banks 
OKSB US Equity SOUTHWEST BANCORP INC/OKLA Banks 
ONB US Equity OLD NATIONAL BANCORP Banks 
ORH US Equity ODYSSEY RE HOLDINGS CORP Insurance 
ORI US Equity OLD REPUBLIC INTL CORP Insurance 
OXPS US Equity OPTIONSXPRESS HOLDINGS INC Diversified Finan Serv 
OZM US Equity OCH-ZIFF CAPITAL MANAGEMEN-A Diversified Finan Serv 
OZRK US Equity BANK OF THE OZARKS Banks 
PACW US Equity PACWEST BANCORP Banks 
PBCT US Equity PEOPLE'S UNITED FINANCIAL Savings&Loans 
PBKS US Equity PROVIDENT BANKSHARES CORP Banks 
PBNY US Equity PROVIDENT NEW YORK BANCORP Savings&Loans 
PCBC US Equity PACIFIC CAPITAL BANCORP Banks 
PFG US Equity PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GROUP Insurance 
PFS US Equity PROVIDENT FINANCIAL SERVICES Savings&Loans 
PGR US Equity PROGRESSIVE CORP Insurance 
PHLY US Equity PHILADELPHIA CONS HLDG CO Insurance 
PICO US Equity PICO HOLDINGS INC Water 
PJC US Equity PIPER JAFFRAY COS Diversified Finan Serv 
PL US Equity PROTECTIVE LIFE CORP Insurance 
PMI US Equity PMI GROUP INC/THE Insurance 
PNC US Equity PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP Banks 
PNFP US Equity PINNACLE FINANCIAL PARTNERS Banks 
PNSN US Equity PENSON WORLDWIDE INC Diversified Finan Serv 
PNX US Equity PHOENIX COMPANIES INC Insurance 
PRA US Equity PROASSURANCE CORP Insurance 
PRE US Equity PARTNERRE LTD Insurance 
PRSP US Equity PROSPERITY BANCSHARES INC Banks 
PRU US Equity PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC Insurance 
PSEC US Equity PROSPECT CAPITAL CORP Investment Companies 
PTP US Equity PLATINUM UNDERWRITERS HLDGS Insurance 
PUK US Equity PRUDENTIAL PLC-ADR Insurance 
PVTB US Equity PRIVATEBANCORP INC Banks 
RBCAA US Equity REPUBLIC BANCORP INC-CLASS A Banks 
RBS US Equity ROYAL BANK OF SCOT-SPON ADR Banks 
RDN US Equity RADIAN GROUP INC Insurance 
RE US Equity EVEREST RE GROUP LTD Insurance 
RF US Equity REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
RGA US Equity REINSURANCE GROUP OF AMERICA Insurance 
RJF US Equity RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL INC Diversified Finan Serv 
RKH US Equity MARKET VECTORS BANK AND BROK Equity Fund 
RLI US Equity RLI CORP Insurance 
RNR US Equity RENAISSANCERE HOLDINGS LTD Insurance 
RY US Equity ROYAL BANK OF CANADA Banks 
SAF US Equity SAFECO CORP Insurance 
SAFT US Equity SAFETY INSURANCE GROUP INC Insurance 
SBCF US Equity SEACOAST BANKING CORP/FL Banks 
SBIB US Equity STERLING BANCSHARES INC/TX Banks 
SBNY US Equity SIGNATURE BANK Banks 
SCHW US Equity SCHWAB (CHARLES) CORP Diversified Finan Serv 
SF US Equity STIFEL FINANCIAL CORP Diversified Finan Serv 
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SFG US Equity STANCORP FINANCIAL GROUP Insurance 
SIGI US Equity SELECTIVE INSURANCE GROUP Insurance 
SIVB US Equity SVB FINANCIAL GROUP Banks 
SLF US Equity SUN LIFE FINANCIAL INC Insurance 
SLM US Equity SLM CORP Diversified Finan Serv 
SNV US Equity SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
STI US Equity SUNTRUST BANKS INC Banks 
STL US Equity STERLING BANCORP-N Y Banks 
STSA US Equity STERLING FINL CORP/SPOKANE Banks 
STT US Equity STATE STREET CORP Banks 
SUSQ US Equity SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES INC Banks 
SWS US Equity SWS GROUP INC Diversified Finan Serv 
TCB US Equity TCF FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
TCBI US Equity TEXAS CAPITAL BANCSHARES INC Banks 
TFSL US Equity TFS FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
THG US Equity HANOVER INSURANCE GROUP INC/ Insurance 
TMCV US Equity TEMECULA VALLEY BANCORP INC Banks 
TMK US Equity TORCHMARK CORP Insurance 
TONE US Equity TIERONE CORP Savings&Loans 
TROW US Equity T ROWE PRICE GROUP INC Diversified Finan Serv 
TRST US Equity TRUSTCO BANK CORP NY Banks 
TRV US Equity TRAVELERS COS INC/THE Insurance 
TSFG US Equity SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP INC Banks 
TWGP US Equity TOWER GROUP INC Insurance 
UAM US Equity UNIVERSAL AMERICAN CORP Healthcare-Services 
UB US Equity UNIONBANCAL CORPORATION Banks 
UBS US Equity UBS AG-REG Banks 
UBSI US Equity UNITED BANKSHARES INC Banks 
UCBH US Equity UCBH HOLDINGS INC Banks 
UCBI US Equity UNITED COMMUNITY BANKS/GA Banks 
UFCS US Equity UNITED FIRE GROUP INC Insurance 
UMBF US Equity UMB FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
UMPQ US Equity UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP Banks 
UNH US Equity UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC Healthcare-Services 
UNM US Equity UNUM GROUP Insurance 
USB US Equity US BANCORP Banks 
UTR US Equity UNITRIN INC Insurance 
VLY US Equity VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP Banks 
VR US Equity VALIDUS HOLDINGS LTD Insurance 
WABC US Equity WESTAMERICA BANCORPORATION Banks 
WAL US Equity WESTERN ALLIANCE BANCORP Banks 
WBS US Equity WEBSTER FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
WCG US Equity WELLCARE HEALTH PLANS INC Healthcare-Services 
WDR US Equity WADDELL & REED FINANCIAL-A Diversified Finan Serv 
WFC US Equity WELLS FARGO & CO Banks 
WFSL US Equity WASHINGTON FEDERAL INC Savings&Loans 
WL US Equity WILMINGTON TRUST CORP Banks 
WLP US Equity WELLPOINT INC Healthcare-Services 
WRB US Equity WR BERKLEY CORP Insurance 
WSBC US Equity WESBANCO INC Banks 
WTFC US Equity WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
WTNY US Equity WHITNEY HOLDING CORP Banks 
XL US Equity XL GROUP PLC Insurance 
ZION US Equity ZIONS BANCORPORATION Banks 
ZNT US Equity ZENITH NATIONAL INSURANCE CP Insurance 
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Banned Stocks without Tradable Options  
 NAME INDUSTRY GROUP 
AAME US Equity ATLANTIC AMERICAN CORP Insurance 
AANB US Equity ABIGAIL ADAMS NATL BANCORP Banks 
ABBC US Equity ABINGTON BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
ABCB US Equity AMERIS BANCORP Banks 
ABCW US Equity ANCHOR BANCORP WISCONSIN INC Savings&Loans 
ABNJ US Equity AMERICAN BANCORP OF NJ Savings&Loans 
ABVA US Equity ALLIANCE BANKSHARES CORP Banks 
ACAP US Equity AMERICAN PHYSICIANS CAPITAL Insurance 
ACBA US Equity AMERICAN COMMUNITY BNCSHS Banks 
ACFC US Equity ATLANTIC COAST FINANCIAL COR Savings&Loans 
ADVNA US Equity ADVANTA CORP-CLASS A Diversified Finan Serv 
AFFM US Equity AFFIRMATIVE INSURANCE HOLDIN Insurance 
AGX US Equity ARGAN INC Engineering&Construction 
AHD US Equity ATLAS ENERGY LP Pipelines 
ALLB US Equity ALLIANCE BANCORP INC OF PENN Banks 
ALNC US Equity ALLIANCE FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
AMCP US Equity AMCOMP INC Insurance 
AMIC US Equity AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE CORP Insurance 
AMNB US Equity AMER NATL BNKSHS/DANVILLE VA Banks 
AMPH US Equity AMERICAN PHYSICIANS SVC GP Insurance 
AMRB US Equity AMERICAN RIVER BANKSHRS (CA) Banks 
ANAT US Equity AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANCE Insurance 
ANNB US Equity ANNAPOLIS BANCORP INC Banks 
APAB US Equity APPALACHIAN BANCSHARES INC Banks 
AROW US Equity ARROW FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
ASBI US Equity AMERIANA BANCORP Savings&Loans 
ASFN US Equity ATLANTIC SOUTHERN FINANCIAL Banks 
ASRV US Equity AMERISERV FINANCIAL INC Banks 
ATBC US Equity ATLANTIC BANCGROUP INC Banks 
ATLO US Equity AMES NATIONAL CORP Banks 
AUBN US Equity AUBURN NATL BANCORPORATION Banks 
AWBC US Equity AMERICANWEST BANCORPORATION Banks 
AXG US Equity ATLAS ACQUISITION HOLDINGS Holding Companies-Divers 
BANF US Equity BANCFIRST CORP Banks 
BARI US Equity BANCORP RHODE ISLAND INC Banks 
BAYN US Equity BAY NATIONAL CORP Banks 
BBNK US Equity BRIDGE CAPITAL HOLDINGS Banks 
BCA US Equity CORPBANCA SA-ADR Banks 
BCAR US Equity BANK OF THE CAROLINAS(NC) Banks 
BCBP US Equity BCB BANCORP INC Banks 
BCP US Equity BROOKE CAPITAL CORP Insurance 
BCSB US Equity BCSB BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
BDGE US Equity BRIDGE BANCORP INC Banks 
BERK US Equity BERKSHIRE BANCORP INC Banks 
BFF US Equity BFC FINANCIAL CORP-CLASS A Savings&Loans 
BFIN US Equity BANKFINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
BFNB US Equity BEACH FIRST NATL BANCSHARES Banks 
BHB US Equity BAR HARBOR BANKSHARES Banks 
BHBC US Equity BEVERLY HILLS BANCORP INC Banks 
BHLB US Equity BERKSHIRE HILLS BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
BKBK US Equity BRITTON & KOONTZ CAPITAL CRP Banks 
BKOR US Equity OAK RIDGE FINANCIAL SERVICES Banks 
BKSC US Equity BANK OF SOUTH CAROLINA CORP Banks 
BLX US Equity BANCO LATINOAMERICANO COME-E Banks 
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BMRC US Equity BANK OF MARIN BANCORP/CA Banks 
BMTC US Equity BRYN MAWR BANK CORP Banks 
BNCL US Equity BENEFICIAL MUTUAL BANCORP IN Savings&Loans 
BNCN US Equity BNC BANCORP Banks 
BNV US Equity BEVERLY NATIONAL CORP Banks 
BOCH US Equity BANK OF COMMERCE HOLDINGS Banks 
BOFI US Equity BOFI HOLDING INC Savings&Loans 
BOFL US Equity BANK OF FLORIDA CORP Banks 
BOMK US Equity BANK OF MCKENNEY/VA Banks 
BOVA US Equity BANK OF VIRGINIA Banks 
BPSG US Equity BROADPOINT GLEACHER SECURITI Diversified Finan Serv 
BRK US Equity BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC Insurance 
BSRR US Equity SIERRA BANCORP Banks 
BTFG US Equity BANCTRUST FINANCIAL GROUP IN Banks 
BWINA US Equity BALDWIN & LYONS INC -CL A Insurance 
BWINB US Equity BALDWIN & LYONS INC -CL B Insurance 
BYFC US Equity BROADWAY FINANCIAL CORP/DE Savings&Loans 
CAC US Equity CAMDEN NATIONAL CORP Banks 
CADE US Equity CADENCE FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
CAFI US Equity CAMCO FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
CAPB US Equity CAPITALSOUTH BANCORP Banks 
CAPE US Equity BARCLAYS ETN+ SHILLER CAPE Asset Allocation Fund 
CART US Equity CAROLINA TRUST BANK Banks 
CARV US Equity CARVER BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
CASB US Equity CASCADE FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
CASH US Equity META FINANCIAL GROUP INC Savings&Loans 
CBAN US Equity COLONY BANKCORP Banks 
CBBO US Equity COLUMBIA BANCORP/OR Banks 
CBC US Equity CAPITOL BANCORP LTD Banks 
CBIN US Equity COMMUNITY BK SHARES/INDIANA Banks 
CBKN US Equity CAPITAL BANK CORP Banks 
CBNK US Equity CHICOPEE BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
CCBD US Equity COMMUNITY CENTRAL BANK CORP Banks 
CCBG US Equity CAPITAL CITY BANK GROUP INC Banks 
CCBP US Equity COMM BANCORP INC Banks 
CCFH US Equity CCF HOLDING COMPANY Banks 
CCNE US Equity CNB FINANCIAL CORP/PA Banks 
CCOW US Equity CAPITAL CORP OF THE WEST Banks 
CEBK US Equity CENTRAL BANCORP INC Banks 
CFBK US Equity CENTRAL FEDERAL CORP Savings&Loans 
CFFC US Equity COMMUNITY FINL CORP/VA Savings&Loans 
CFFI US Equity C & F FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
CFNL US Equity CARDINAL FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
CHEV US Equity CHEVIOT FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
CITZ US Equity CFS BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
CIZN US Equity CITIZENS HOLDING COMPANY Banks 
CJBK US Equity CENTRAL JERSEY BANCORP Banks 
CLBH US Equity CAROLINA BANK HOLDINGS INC Banks 
CLFC US Equity CENTER FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
CMFB US Equity COMMERCEFIRST BANCORP Banks 
CMGI US Equity CMGI INC Internet 
CMSB US Equity CMS BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
CNAF US Equity COMMERCIAL NATL FINL CORP/PA Banks 
CNBC US Equity CENTER BANCORP INC Banks 
CNBKA US Equity CENTURY BANCORP INC -CL A Banks 
CNLA US Equity COMMUNITY NATIONAL BANK OF T Banks 
COBH US Equity PENNSYLVANIA COMMERCE BANCRP Banks 
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COBZ US Equity COBIZ FINANCIAL INC Banks 
COOP US Equity COOPERATIVE BANKSHARES INC Savings&Loans 
COWN US Equity COWEN GROUP INC-CLASS A Diversified Finan Serv 
CPBC US Equity COMMUNITY PARTNERS BANCORP Banks 
CPBK US Equity COMMUNITY CAPITAL CORP Banks 
CPHL US Equity OCEAN I CORP Insurance 
CRFN US Equity CRESCENT FINANCIAL BANCSHARE Banks 
CRMH US Equity CRM HOLDINGS LTD Insurance 
CRRB US Equity CARROLLTON BANCORP Banks 
CRVL US Equity CORVEL CORP Commercial Services 
CSBC US Equity CITIZENS SOUTH BANKING CORP Savings&Loans 
CSBK US Equity CLIFTON SAVINGS BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
CSFL US Equity CENTERSTATE BANKS INC Banks 
CSHB US Equity COMMUNITY SHORES BANK CORP Banks 
CSNT US Equity CRESCENT BANKING CO/GA Banks 
CTBC US Equity CONNECTICUT BANK & TRUST Banks 
CTBI US Equity COMMUNITY TRUST BANCORP INC Banks 
CTBK US Equity CITY BANK LYNNWOOD WA Banks 
CTZN US Equity CITIZENS FIRST BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
CVBK US Equity CENTRAL VIRGINIA BANKSHARES Banks 
CVCY US Equity CENTRAL VALLEY COMM BANCORP Banks 
CVLL US Equity COMMUNITY VALLEY BANCORP Banks 
CVLY US Equity CODORUS VALLEY BANCORP INC Banks 
CWBC US Equity COMMUNITY WEST BANCSHARES Banks 
CWBS US Equity COMMONWEALTH BANKSHARES INC Banks 
CWLZ US Equity COWLITZ BANCORP Banks 
CZFC US Equity CITIZENS FIRST CORP Banks 
CZWI US Equity CITIZENS COMMUNITY BANCORP I Savings&Loans 
DEAR US Equity DEARBORN BANCORP INC Banks 
DGICA US Equity DONEGAL GROUP INC-CL A Insurance 
DGICB US Equity DONEGAL GROUP INC-B Insurance 
DHIL US Equity DIAMOND HILL INVESTMENT GRP Diversified Finan Serv 
DR US Equity DARWIN PROFESSIONAL UNDERWRI Insurance 
DSL US Equity DOWNEY FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
DUF US Equity DUFF & PHELPS CORP-CLASS A Diversified Finan Serv 
EBSB US Equity MERIDIAN INTERSTATE BANCORP Savings&Loans 
EBTX US Equity ENCORE BANCSHARES INC Banks 
ECBE US Equity ECB BANCORP INC Banks 
EGBN US Equity EAGLE BANCORP INC Banks 
EIHI US Equity EASTERN INSURANCE HOLDINGS Insurance 
EII US Equity ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE ACQUI Holding Companies-Divers 
EMCI US Equity EMC INS GROUP INC Insurance 
EMITF US Equity ELBIT IMAGING LTD Investment Companies 
ESBF US Equity ESB FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
ESBK US Equity ELMIRA SAVINGS BANK Savings&Loans 
ESGR US Equity ENSTAR GROUP LTD Insurance 
EVBN US Equity EVANS BANCORP INC Banks 
EVBS US Equity EASTERN VIRGINIA BANKSHARES Banks 
FABK US Equity FIRST ADVANTAGE BANCORP Banks 
FAC US Equity FIRST ACCEPTANCE CORP Insurance 
FBCM US Equity FBR & CO Diversified Finan Serv 
FBIZ US Equity FIRST BUSINESS FINANCIAL SER Banks 
FBMI US Equity FIRSTBANK CORP/ALMA MICH Banks 
FBMS US Equity FIRST BANCSHARES INC/MS Banks 
FBNC US Equity FIRST BANCORP/NC Banks 
FBSI US Equity FIRST BANCSHARES INC (MO) Savings&Loans 
FBSS US Equity FAUQUIER BANKSHARES INC Banks 
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FBTC US Equity FIRST BANCTRUST CORP Savings&Loans 
FCAL US Equity FIRST CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL G Banks 
FCAP US Equity FIRST CAPITAL INC Savings&Loans 
FCBC US Equity FIRST COMMUNITY BANCSHARES Banks 
FCCO US Equity FIRST COMMUNITY CORP Banks 
FCCY US Equity 1ST CONSTITUTION BANCORP Banks 
FCFL US Equity FIRST COMMUNITY BANK CORP OF Savings&Loans 
FCNCA US Equity FIRST CITIZENS BCSHS  -CL A Banks 
FCVA US Equity FIRST CAPITAL BANCORP INC Banks 
FCZA US Equity FIRST CITIZENS BANC CORP Banks 
FDEF US Equity FIRST DEFIANCE FINL CORP Savings&Loans 
FDT US Equity FIRST TRUST DEVELP MKT EX-US Equity Fund 
FED US Equity FIRSTFED FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
FFBH US Equity FIRST FED BNCSHS OF ARKANSAS Savings&Loans 
FFCH US Equity FIRST FINANCIAL HOLDINGS INC Savings&Loans 
FFCO US Equity FEDFIRST FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
FFDF US Equity FFD FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
FFFD US Equity NORTH CENTRAL BANCSHARES INC Savings&Loans 
FFG US Equity FBL FINANCIAL GROUP INC-CL A Insurance 
FFHS US Equity FIRST FRANKLIN CORP Savings&Loans 
FFIC US Equity FLUSHING FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
FFKT US Equity FARMERS CAPITAL BANK CORP Banks 
FFKY US Equity FIRST FINANCIAL SERVICE CORP Banks 
FFNM US Equity FIRST FEDERAL OF NORTHERN MI Savings&Loans 
FFSX US Equity FIRST FED BANKSHARES INC Savings&Loans 
FIFG US Equity 1ST INDEPENDENCE FINANCIAL Savings&Loans 
FISI US Equity FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS INC Banks 
FKFS US Equity FIRST KEYSTONE FINANCIAL INC Savings&Loans 
FLIC US Equity FIRST OF LONG ISLAND CORP Banks 
FMAR US Equity FIRST MARINER BANCORP INC Banks 
FMFC US Equity FIRST M & F CORP Banks 
FNBN US Equity FNB UNITED CORP Banks 
FNLC US Equity FIRST BANCORP INC/ME Banks 
FNSC US Equity FIRST NATIONAL BANCSHARES Banks 
FPBI US Equity FPB BANCORP INC Banks 
FPBN US Equity 1ST PACIFIC BANCORP Banks 
FPFC US Equity FIRST PLACE FINANCIAL /OHIO Savings&Loans 
FPIC US Equity FPIC INSURANCE GROUP INC Insurance 
FPTB US Equity FIRST PACTRUST BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
FRBK US Equity REPUBLIC FIRST BANCORP INC Banks 
FRGB US Equity FIRST REGIONAL BANCORP/CAL Banks 
FRME US Equity FIRST MERCHANTS CORP Banks 
FSBI US Equity FIDELITY BANCORP INC/PENN Savings&Loans 
FSBK US Equity FIRST SOUTH BANCORP INC /NC Banks 
FSGI US Equity FIRST SECURITY GROUP INC/TN Banks 
FSNM US Equity FIRST STATE BANCORPORATION Banks 
FUNC US Equity FIRST UNITED CORP Banks 
FWV US Equity FIRST WEST VIRGINIA BANCORP Banks 
FXCB US Equity FOX CHASE BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
GABC US Equity GERMAN AMERICAN BANCORP Banks 
GAN US Equity GAINSCO INC Insurance 
GBH US Equity GREEN BUILDERS INC Home Builders 
GBL US Equity GAMCO INVESTORS INC-A Diversified Finan Serv 
GBTS US Equity GATEWAY FINANCIAL HOLDINGS Banks 
GFED US Equity GUARANTY FEDERAL BNCSHS INC Banks 
GFLB US Equity GREAT FLORIDA BANK-CLASS A Banks 
GGAL US Equity GRUPO FINANCIERO GALICIA-ADR Banks 
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GIW US Equity WILBER CORP Banks 
GLBZ US Equity GLEN BURNIE BANCORP Banks 
GOV US Equity GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES INCOME REITS 
GRAN US Equity BANK OF GRANITE CORP Banks 
GRNB US Equity GREEN BANKSHARES INC Banks 
GSBC US Equity GREAT SOUTHERN BANCORP INC Banks 
GSLA US Equity GS FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
HABC US Equity HABERSHAM BANCORP Banks 
HALL US Equity HALLMARK FINL SERVICES INC Insurance 
HARL US Equity HARLEYSVILLE SVNGS FIN CORP Savings&Loans 
HAXS US Equity HEALTHAXIS INC Healthcare-Services 
HBNK US Equity HAMPDEN BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
HBOS US Equity HERITAGE FINANCIAL GROUP INC Savings&Loans 
HEOP US Equity HERITAGE OAKS BANCORP Banks 
HFBC US Equity HOPFED BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
HFFC US Equity HF FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
HFWA US Equity HERITAGE FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
HGIC US Equity HARLEYSVILLE GROUP INC Insurance 
HIFS US Equity HINGHAM INSTITUTION FOR SVGS Savings&Loans 
HMNF US Equity HMN FINANCIAL INC Savings&Loans 
HMPR US Equity HAMPTON ROADS BANKSHARES INC Banks 
HOMB US Equity HOME BANCSHARES INC Banks 
HOME US Equity HOME FEDERAL BANCORP INC/ID Savings&Loans 
HRZB US Equity HORIZON FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
HTBK US Equity HERITAGE COMMERCE CORP Banks 
HTLF US Equity HEARTLAND FINANCIAL USA INC Banks 
HWBK US Equity HAWTHORN BANCSHARES INC Banks 
HWFG US Equity HARRINGTON WEST FINANCIAL GR Savings&Loans 
IAAC US Equity INTL ASSETS HOLDING CORP Diversified Finan Serv 
IBCA US Equity INTERVEST BANCSHARES CORP-A Banks 
IBCP US Equity INDEPENDENT BANK CORP - MICH Banks 
IBNK US Equity INTEGRA BANK CORPORATION Banks 
ICH US Equity INVESTORS CAPITAL HOLDINGS Diversified Finan Serv 
IFC US Equity IRWIN FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
IFSB US Equity INDEPENDENCE FED SAV BANK Savings&Loans 
IHC US Equity INDEPENDENCE HOLDING CO Insurance 
IMP US Equity IMPERIAL CAPITAL BANCORP INC Banks 
INCB US Equity INDIANA COMMUNITY BANCORP Savings&Loans 
IRE US Equity BANK OF IRELAND-SPONS ADR Banks 
ITIC US Equity INVESTORS TITLE CO Insurance 
JAXB US Equity JACKSONVILLE BANCORP INC FL Banks 
JFBC US Equity JEFFERSONVILLE BANCORP/N Y Banks 
JFBI US Equity JEFFERSON BANCSHARES INC/TN Savings&Loans 
JLI US Equity JESUP & LAMONT INC Diversified Finan Serv 
JMP US Equity JMP GROUP INC Diversified Finan Serv 
JXSB US Equity JACKSONVILLE BANCORP INC/IL Savings&Loans 
KCLI US Equity KANSAS CITY LIFE INS CO Insurance 
KENT US Equity KENT FINANCIAL SVCS Diversified Finan Serv 
KFED US Equity KAISER FEDERAL FINANCIAL GRO Savings&Loans 
KFFB US Equity KENTUCKY FIRST FEDERAL BANCO Savings&Loans 
KFS US Equity KINGSWAY FINANCIAL SERVICES Insurance 
KRNY US Equity KEARNY FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
LABC US Equity LOUISIANA BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
LARK US Equity LANDMARK BANCORP INC Banks 
LBBB US Equity LIBERTY BELL BANK Banks 
LBCP US Equity LIBERTY BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
LEGC US Equity LEGACY BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
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LEH US Equity LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC Diversified Finan Serv 
LION US Equity FIDELITY SOUTHERN CORP Banks 
LKFN US Equity LAKELAND FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
LNCB US Equity LINCOLN BANCORP Banks 
LPSB US Equity LAPORTE BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
LSBI US Equity LSB FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
LSBK US Equity LAKE SHORE BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
LSBX US Equity LSB CORP Savings&Loans 
LTS US Equity LADENBURG THALMANN FINANCIAL Diversified Finan Serv 
MAIN US Equity MAIN STREET CAPITAL CORP Investment Companies 
MASB US Equity MASSBANK CORP Savings&Loans 
MBHI US Equity MIDWEST BANC HOLDINGS INC Banks 
MBP US Equity MID PENN BANCORP INC Banks 
MBR US Equity MERCANTILE BANCORP -QUINCY Banks 
MBRG US Equity MIDDLEBURG FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
MBTF US Equity MBT FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
MBVA US Equity MILLENNIUM BANKSHARES CORP Banks 
MBVT US Equity MERCHANTS BANCSHARES INC Banks 
MBWM US Equity MERCANTILE BANK CORP Banks 
MCBF US Equity MONARCH COMMUNITY BANCORP Savings&Loans 
MCBI US Equity METROCORP BANCSHARES INC Banks 
MER US Equity MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC Diversified Finan Serv 
MERR US Equity MERRIMAN HOLDINGS INC Diversified Finan Serv 
MFLR US Equity MAYFLOWER BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
MFNC US Equity MACKINAC FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
MFSF US Equity MUTUALFIRST FINANCIAL INC Savings&Loans 
MGYR US Equity MAGYAR BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
MHLD US Equity MAIDEN HOLDINGS LTD Insurance 
MIGP US Equity MERCER INSURANCE GROUP INC Insurance 
MKL US Equity MARKEL CORP Insurance 
MKTX US Equity MARKETAXESS HOLDINGS INC Diversified Finan Serv 
MNRK US Equity MONARCH FINANCIAL HOLDINGS Banks 
MOFG US Equity MIDWESTONE FINANCIAL GROUP I Banks 
MROE US Equity MONROE BANCORP Banks 
MSBF US Equity MSB FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
MSFG US Equity MAINSOURCE FINANCIAL GROUP I Banks 
MSL US Equity MIDSOUTH BANCORP INC Banks 
NAHC US Equity NATIONAL ATLANTIC HOLDINGS-A Insurance 
NATL US Equity NATIONAL INTERSTATE CORP Insurance 
NBBC US Equity NEWBRIDGE BANCORP Banks 
NBN US Equity NORTHEAST BANCORP Banks 
NBTF US Equity NB&T FINANCIAL GROUP INC Banks 
NCBC US Equity NEW CENTURY BANCORP INC Banks 
NCC US Equity NATIONAL CITY CORP Banks 
NEBS US Equity NEW ENGLAND BANCSHARES INC Savings&Loans 
NECB US Equity NORTHEAST COMMUNITY BANCORP Savings&Loans 
NEWT US Equity NEWTEK BUSINESS SERVICES INC Commercial Services 
NFBK US Equity NORTHFIELD BANCORP INC/NJ Savings&Loans 
NFSB US Equity NEWPORT BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
NHTB US Equity NEW HAMPSHIRE THRIFT BANCSHS Savings&Loans 
NICK US Equity NICHOLAS FINANCIAL INC Diversified Finan Serv 
NKSH US Equity NATIONAL BANKSHARES INC/VA Banks 
NMX US Equity NYMEX HOLDINGS INC Diversified Finan Serv 
NOVB US Equity NORTH VALLEY BANCORP Banks 
NRIM US Equity NORTHRIM BANCORP INC Banks 
NSEC US Equity NATIONAL SECURITY GROUP INC Insurance 
NSFC US Equity NORTHERN STATES FINL CORP Banks 
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NTQ US Equity NTR ACQUISITION CO Holding Companies-Divers 
NVSL US Equity NAUGATUCK VALLEY FINANCIAL Savings&Loans 
NWFL US Equity NORWOOD FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
NWLIA US Equity NATL WESTERN LIFE INS-CL A Insurance 
NXTY US Equity NEXITY FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
NYM US Equity NYMAGIC INC Insurance 
OCFC US Equity OCEANFIRST FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
OLBK US Equity OLD LINE BANCSHARES INC Banks 
OLCB US Equity OHIO LEGACY CORP Banks 
ONFC US Equity ONEIDA FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
OPHC US Equity OPTIMUMBANK HOLDINGS INC Banks 
OPOF US Equity OLD POINT FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
OPY US Equity OPPENHEIMER HOLDINGS-CL A Diversified Finan Serv 
ORIT US Equity ORITANI FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
OSBC US Equity OLD SECOND BANCORP INC Banks 
OSBK US Equity OSAGE BANCSHARES INC Savings&Loans 
OSHC US Equity OCEAN SHORE HOLDING CO Savings&Loans 
OVBC US Equity OHIO VALLEY BANC CORP Banks 
PABK US Equity PAB BANKSHARES INC Banks 
PBCI US Equity PAMRAPO BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
PBHC US Equity PATHFINDER BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
PBIB US Equity PORTER BANCORP INC Banks 
PBIP US Equity PRUDENTIAL BANCORP INC OF PA Savings&Loans 
PCBI US Equity PEOPLES COMMUNITY BANCORP Savings&Loans 
PCBK US Equity PACIFIC CONTINENTAL CORP Banks 
PCBS US Equity PROVIDENT COMMUNITY BANCSHAR Banks 
PEBK US Equity PEOPLES BANCORP OF NC Banks 
PEBO US Equity PEOPLES BANCORP INC Banks 
PFBC US Equity PREFERRED BANK/LOS ANGELES Banks 
PFBI US Equity PREMIER FINANCIAL BANCORP Banks 
PFBX US Equity PEOPLES FINANCIAL CORP/MISS Banks 
PFED US Equity PARK BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
PKBK US Equity PARKE BANCORP INC Banks 
PLCC US Equity PAULSON CAPITAL CORP Diversified Finan Serv 
PLFE US Equity PRESIDENTIAL LIFE CORP Insurance 
PMACA US Equity PMA CAPITAL CORPORATION-CL A Insurance 
PMBC US Equity PACIFIC MERCANTILE BANCORP Banks 
PNBC US Equity PRINCETON NATIONAL BANCORP Banks 
PNBK US Equity PATRIOT NATIONAL BANCORP INC Banks 
PPBI US Equity PACIFIC PREMIER BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
PRK US Equity PARK NATIONAL CORP Banks 
PROS US Equity PROCENTURY CORP Insurance 
PROV US Equity PROVIDENT FINANCIAL HLDGS Savings&Loans 
PRWT US Equity PREMIERWEST BANCORP Banks 
PSBC US Equity PACIFIC STATE BANCORP Banks 
PSBH US Equity PSB HOLDINGS INC Savings&Loans 
PTA US Equity PENN TREATY AMER CORP Insurance 
PULB US Equity PULASKI FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
PVFC US Equity PVF CAPITAL CORP Savings&Loans 
PVSA US Equity PARKVALE FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
PWOD US Equity PENNS WOODS BANCORP INC Banks 
PZN US Equity PZENA INVESTMENT MANAGM-CL A Diversified Finan Serv 
QCRH US Equity QCR HOLDINGS INC Banks 
QNTA US Equity QUANTA CAPITAL HOLDINGS LTD Insurance 
RAMR US Equity RAM HOLDINGS LTD Insurance 
RBNF US Equity RURBAN FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
RBPAA US Equity ROYAL BANCSHARES OF PENN-A Banks 
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RCBK US Equity RIVER CITY BANK/VA Banks 
RCKB US Equity ROCKVILLE FINANCIAL INC Savings&Loans 
RIVR US Equity RIVER VALLEY BANCORP Savings&Loans 
RNST US Equity RENASANT CORP Banks 
RODM US Equity RODMAN & RENSHAW CAPITAL GRP Internet 
ROMA US Equity ROMA FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
ROME US Equity ROME BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
RPFG US Equity RAINIER PACIFIC FINANCIAL GR Savings&Loans 
RVSB US Equity RIVERVIEW BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
SAL US Equity SALISBURY BANCORP INC Banks 
SAMB US Equity SUN AMERICAN BANCORP Banks 
SASR US Equity SANDY SPRING BANCORP INC Banks 
SAVB US Equity SAVANNAH BANCORP INC Banks 
SBBX US Equity SUSSEX BANCORP Banks 
SBKC US Equity SECURITY BANK CORP Banks 
SBP US Equity SANTANDER BANCORP Banks 
SBSI US Equity SOUTHSIDE BANCSHARES INC Banks 
SCA US Equity SYNCORA HOLDINGS LTD Insurance 
SCBT US Equity SCBT FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
SCMF US Equity SOUTHERN COMMUNITY FINANCIAL Banks 
SEAB US Equity SEABRIGHT INSURANCE HOLDINGS Insurance 
SFNC US Equity SIMMONS FIRST NATL CORP-CL A Banks 
SFST US Equity SOUTHERN FIRST BANCSHARES Banks 
SGB US Equity SOUTHWEST GEORGIA FINL CORP Banks 
SHG US Equity SHINHAN FINANCIAL GROUP-ADR Diversified Finan Serv 
SIEB US Equity SIEBERT FINANCIAL CORP Diversified Finan Serv 
SIFI US Equity SI FINANCIAL GROUP INC Savings&Loans 
SMBC US Equity SOUTHERN MISSOURI BANCORP Savings&Loans 
SMCG US Equity MILLENNIUM INDIA ACQUISITION Closed-end Funds 
SMHG US Equity SANDERS MORRIS HARRIS GRP IN Diversified Finan Serv 
SMMF US Equity SUMMIT FINANCIAL GROUP INC Banks 
SMTB US Equity SMITHTOWN BANCORP INC Banks 
SNBC US Equity SUN BANCORP INC-NJ Banks 
SOCB US Equity SOUTHCOAST FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
SOMH US Equity SOMERSET HILLS BANCORP Banks 
SONA US Equity SOUTHERN NATL BANCORP OF VA Banks 
SOV US Equity SANTANDER HOLDINGS USA INC Savings&Loans 
SRCE US Equity 1ST SOURCE CORP Banks 
SSBI US Equity SUMMIT STATE BANK Banks 
SSBX US Equity SILVER STATE BANCORP Banks 
SSFN US Equity STEWARDSHIP FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
STBA US Equity S & T BANCORP INC Banks 
STBC US Equity STATE BANCORP INC Banks 
STBK US Equity STERLING BANKS INC Banks 
STEL US Equity STELLARONE CORP Banks 
STFC US Equity STATE AUTO FINANCIAL CORP Insurance 
STU US Equity STUDENT LOAN CORP Diversified Finan Serv 
SUAI US Equity SPECIALTY UNDERWRITERS' ALLI Insurance 
SUBK US Equity SUFFOLK BANCORP Banks 
SUFB US Equity FIRST BANKSHARES INC Banks 
SUPR US Equity SUPERIOR BANCORP Banks 
SUR US Equity CNA SURETY CORP Insurance 
SVBI US Equity SEVERN BANCORP INC/MD Savings&Loans 
SYBT US Equity S.Y. BANCORP INC Banks 
TAMB US Equity TAMALPAIS BANCORP Banks 
TAQ US Equity TRANSFORMA ACQUISITION GROUP Holding Companies-Divers 
TAYC US Equity TAYLOR CAPITAL GROUP INC Banks 
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TBBK US Equity BANCORP INC/THE Banks 
TBHS US Equity BANK HOLDINGS INC/THE Banks 
TCBK US Equity TRICO BANCSHARES Banks 
TCHC US Equity 21ST CENTURY HOLDING CO Insurance 
TDBK US Equity TIDELANDS BANCSHARES INC Banks 
TFIN US Equity TEAM FINANCIAL INC Banks 
TGIC US Equity TRIAD GUARANTY INC Insurance 
THFF US Equity FIRST FINANCIAL CORP/INDIANA Banks 
THRD US Equity TF FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
TIBB US Equity TIB FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
TIL US Equity TRANS-INDIA ACQUISITION CORP Holding Companies-Divers 
TMP US Equity TOMPKINS FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
TNCC US Equity TENNESSEE COMMERCE BANCORP Banks 
TOFC US Equity TOWER FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
TOWN US Equity TOWNE BANK Banks 
TRH US Equity TRANSATLANTIC HOLDINGS INC Insurance 
TRUE US Equity CENTRUE FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
TSBK US Equity TIMBERLAND BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
TSH US Equity TECHE HOLDING CO Savings&Loans 
TWPG US Equity THOMAS WEISEL PARTNERS GROUP Diversified Finan Serv 
UBCP US Equity UNITED BANCORP INC/OHIO Banks 
UBFO US Equity UNITED SECURITY BANCSHARE/CA Banks 
UBNK US Equity UNITED FINANCIAL BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
UBOH US Equity UNITED BANCSHARES INC/OHIO Banks 
UBSH US Equity UNION FIRST MARKET BANKSHARE Banks 
UCBA US Equity UNITED COMMUNITY BANCORP Banks 
UCFC US Equity UNITED COMMUNITY FINANCIAL Savings&Loans 
UNAM US Equity UNICO AMERICAN CORP Insurance 
UNB US Equity UNION BANKSHARES INC /VT Banks 
UNIB US Equity UNIVERSITY BANCORP INC Banks 
UNTY US Equity UNITY BANCORP INC Banks 
USBI US Equity UNITED SECURITY BANCSHARES Banks 
UVSP US Equity UNIVEST CORP OF PENNSYLVANIA Banks 
UWBK US Equity UNITED WESTERN BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
VBFC US Equity VILLAGE BANK AND TRUST FINAN Banks 
VCBI US Equity VIRGINIA COMMERCE BANCORP Banks 
VIST US Equity VIST FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
VNBC US Equity VINEYARD NATL BANCORP CO Banks 
VPFG US Equity VIEWPOINT FINANCIAL GROUP IN Banks 
VSBN US Equity VSB BANCORP INC Banks 
VYFC US Equity VALLEY FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
WAIN US Equity WAINWRIGHT BANK TRUST CO Banks 
WASH US Equity WASHINGTON TRUST BANCORP Banks 
WAUW US Equity WAUWATOSA HOLDINGS INC Savings&Loans 
WAYN US Equity WAYNE SAVINGS BANCSHARES INC Savings&Loans 
WB US Equity WACHOVIA CORP Banks 
WBCO US Equity WASHINGTON BANKING CO Banks 
WBNK US Equity WACCAMAW BANKSHARES INC Banks 
WCBO US Equity WEST COAST BANCORP/OREGON Banks 
WFBC US Equity WILLOW FINANCIAL BANCORP INC Savings&Loans 
WFD US Equity WESTFIELD FINANCIAL INC Savings&Loans 
WGNB US Equity WGNB CORP Banks 
WHG US Equity WESTWOOD HOLDINGS GROUP INC Diversified Finan Serv 
WHI US Equity W HOLDING COMPANY INC Banks 
WIBC US Equity WILSHIRE BANCORP INC Banks 
WM US Equity WASHINGTON MUTUAL Banks 
WPL US Equity W.P. STEWART & CO LTD Diversified Finan Serv 
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WSB US Equity WSB HOLDINGS INC Savings&Loans 
WSFG US Equity WSB FINANCIAL GROUP INC Banks 
WSFS US Equity WSFS FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
WTBA US Equity WEST BANCORPORATION Banks 
WTM US Equity WHITE MOUNTAINS INSURANCE GP Insurance 
WVFC US Equity WVS FINANCIAL CORP Savings&Loans 
Y US Equity ALLEGHANY CORP Insurance 
YAVY US Equity YADKIN VALLEY FINANCIAL CORP Banks 
 
 
 
